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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (1,2), the cause of coronavirus dis-
ease (COVID-19), has been spreading globally since 
it was first reported in Wuhan, China, on December 
30, 2019 (3,4), infecting >10 million persons and caus-
ing massive disruption of daily lives and substantial 
economic consequences (5). Given the expanding 
pandemic and the absence of effective vaccines and 
antiviral drugs, the best strategy to control the spread 
of SARS-CoV-2 might be testing, contact tracing, and 
quarantining. Early implementation of diagnostic 
testing enables contact tracing and quarantining to re-
duce transmission in the community and can protect 
limited healthcare resources. 
The importation of SARS-CoV-2 into Africa was 
inevitable given the volume of air travel and move-
ment of tourists, traders, and workers between coun-
tries. We document COVID-19 outbreak prepared-
ness and response in Uganda, a landlocked country 
in East Africa with entry by international flight or 
overland from bordering countries. The experience in 
Uganda provides a unique opportunity to follow vi-
rus transmission when early strong interventions are 
applied. We describe the importation of COVID-19 
into Uganda and SARS-CoV-2 genomic data acquired 
from local sequencing efforts.
The Study
Africa’s first case COVID-19 was recorded in Egypt 
on February 14, 2020 (6), and as of June 30, a total 
of 52 countries in Africa had reported cases. In an-
ticipation of COVID-19 entry into Africa, the Uganda 
Virus Research Institute (UVRI) established SARS-
CoV-2 diagnostics capacity in early February. The 
screening of all international arrivals and quarantine 
of suspected case-patients began March 19. The first 
COVID-19 case was detected in a returning traveler 
on March 21. Immediately after this first case was 
identified, a ban on international passenger flights 
was implemented on March 22, followed by a ban on 
local travel and public gatherings on March 27. After 
public health officials recognized that international 
truck drivers arriving with cargo from neighboring 
countries (primarily Kenya and Tanzania) posed a 
risk for virus importation, testing of truck drivers 
was initiated on April 13 at main border entry points 
(Figure 1) (https://www.health.go.ug/category/
events-and-updates/page/4), and as of May 18, en-
try into Uganda required a negative SARS-CoV-2 test. 
A timeline shows various measures of public health 
preparedness and response, including testing activ-
ity, the total number of cases in Uganda, cases among 
truck drivers, and important intervention dates (Ap-
pendix Figure 1, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/26/10/20-2575-App1.pdf).
As of June 30, public health officials in Uganda 
had detected >1,500 cases in the country or at points 
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We established rapid local viral sequencing to docu-
ment the genomic diversity of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 entering Uganda. Virus lineages 
closely followed the travel origins of infected persons. 
Our sequence data provide an important baseline for 
tracking any further transmission of the virus throughout 
the country and region.
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of entry and had conducted >150,000 diagnostics 
tests. Approximately 2,000 tests per day have been 
performed at UVRI, which is designated as a Center 
of Excellence for Evaluation of COVID-19 Diagnos-
tics by the Africa Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention, by using real-time reverse transcription 
PCR assays on respiratory swabs samples from sus-
pected case-patients (7). To facilitate virus tracing, we 
established local sequencing capacity to determine 
full viral genome sequences from confirmed COV-
ID-19 case-patients. 
We report 20 SARS-CoV-2 genomic sequences 
from Uganda, obtained from 14 persons arriving 
from regions with circulating SARS-CoV-2 and 6 
truck drivers screened at Uganda points-of-entry (Ta-
ble; Figure 1). This study was approved by the UVRI 
Figure 1. International flight 
routes of imported cases 
(colored lines) and the 4 main 
points of land entry into Uganda 
from Kenya, Tanzania, and 
South Sudan (colored dots).
 
Table. Summary characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 genomes obtained from 20 persons entering Uganda* 
Genome GISAID ID† Sample date Ct 
Patient 
age, y Patient travel history Lineage‡ 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG001/2020 EPI_ISL_451183 2020 Mar 23 19 48 Miami to Istanbul A 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG002/2020 EPI_ISL_451184 2020 Mar 26 19 43 Dubai A 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG003/2020 EPI_ISL_451185 2020 Mar 27 22 10 UK B.1.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG004/2020 EPI_ISL_451186 2020 Mar 27 18 25 UK to NL to Rwanda B.1.1.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG005/2020 EPI_ISL_451187 2020 Mar 27 18 26 UK to NL to Rwanda B 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG006/2020 EPI_ISL_451188 2020 Mar 30 23 27 UK to NL to Rwanda B 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG007/2020 EPI_ISL_451189 2020 Mar 30 21 8 UK to NL to Rwanda B.1.1.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG008/2020 EPI_ISL_451190 2020 Mar 30 22 7 UK to NL to Rwanda B.1.1.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG009/2020 EPI_ISL_451191 2020 Mar 30 20 9 UK to NL to Rwanda B.1.1.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG010/2020 EPI_ISL_451192 2020 Mar 30 22 27 UK to NL to Rwanda B.1.1.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG011/2020 EPI_ISL_451193 2020 Mar 30 21 29 Contact B.4 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG012/2020 EPI_ISL_451194 2020 Mar 22 24 37 Dubai A 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG013/2020 EPI_ISL_451195 2020 Mar 22 23 35 Dubai B 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG014/2020 EPI_ISL_451196 2020 Mar 25 27 31 Dubai B.1.1.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG015/2020 EPI_ISL_451197 2020 Apr 27 16 27 Kenya, by truck B.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG016/2020 EPI_ISL_451198 2020 Apr 27 19 52 Kenya, by truck B.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG017/2020 EPI_ISL_451199 2020 Apr 20 22 42 Tanzania, by truck A 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG018/2020 EPI_ISL_451200 2020 May 1 28 22 Tanzania, by truck B.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG019/2020 EPI_ISL_451201 2020 Apr 30 29 39 Kenya, by truck B.1 
hCoV-19/Uganda/UG020/2020 EPI_ISL_451202 2020 May 1 25 47 Kenya, by truck B.1 
*Ct, cycle threshold (based on diagnostic real-time reverse transcription PCR; NL, the Netherlands; SARS-CoV-2, severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2; UK, United Kingdom. 
†Virus genomes sequences available from GISAID (https://www.gisaid.org). 
‡SARS-CoV-2 lineages determined by using CoV-GLUE (13). 
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Figure 2. Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) genomes in 
Uganda. The full SARS-CoV-2 genomes used for phylogenetic lineage nomenclature (A. Rambaut et al., unpub. data, https://doi.
org/10.1101/2020.04.17.046086) as defined on May 19, 2020, were retrieved from GISAID (http://www.gisaid.org) (8). Identical 
sequences were removed, and a total of 395 global representative sequences from each phylogenetic lineage type were selected for 
further phylogenetic analyses. The reported Uganda sequences, combined with the global SARS-CoV-2 sequences, were aligned by 
using MAFFT (9) and untranslated regions at 5′ and 3′ were trimmed. Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree was constructed in RAxML 
(10), under the general time-reversible plus gamma distribution model as best-fitted substitution model determined by IQ-TREE (11) 
and run for 100 pseudo-replicates. The resulting tree was visualized in Figtree (12) and rooted at the point of splitting lineage A and B. 
Scale bar indicates 6 × 10–5 nucleotide substitutions per site. The branch length is drawn to the scale of nucleotide substitutions per site. 
The Uganda genomes are indicated in red. The 2 major lineages of SARS-CoV-2 (A and B) are indicated to the left of the tree; the main 
groups of the Uganda genomes (A, B1.1.1, B4) are indicated by colored boxes to the right of the tree.
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Research and Ethics Committee (approval no. 
00001354, study reference no. GC/127/20/04/771). 
We compared the 20 SARS-CoV-2 genomes de-
tected in Uganda with genomes detected globally. The 
Uganda genomes belonged to phylogenetic lineages 
A, B, B.1, B.1.1, B.1.1.1, and B.4, among which lineage 
B.1 has the largest number of sequences that have 
spread to >20 countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, 
and Australia (https://github.com/hCoV-2019/
lineages). Genome UG001 (from a traveler arriving 
from the United States), genomes UG002 and UG012 
(from travelers arriving from Dubai), and genome 
UG017 (from a truck driver from Tanzania) fall with-
in SARS-CoV-2 lineage A (A. Rambaut et al., unpub. 
data, https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.17.046086), 
with the nearest known genomes occurring in Asia, 
Australia, Kenya, and the United States (Figure 2). 
Genome UG011 was from a contact of a Uganda case-
patient and is most related to USA/WA-UW-1948 
and UnitedArabEmirates/L068 strains within lineage 
B.4 (Figure 2). Genomes UG004, UG007, UG008, and 
UG010 were detected in a group of travelers return-
ing from the United Kingdom; these genomes fall 
within lineage B.1.1.1, which included other United 
Kingdom–derived genomes (Figure 2). Also in this 
lineage is genome UG014, detected in a traveler re-
turning from Dubai. Additional sequences from a 
traveling group (UG005 and UG006) were assigned to 
lineage B, whereas UG003 (assigned to lineage B.1.1) 
and UG009 (assigned to lineage B.1.1.1) were closely 
related to the lineage B.1.1.1, containing genomes 
from the traveling group in whom genomes UG004, 
UG007, UG008, and UG010 were detected. Genome 
UG013 (from a traveler returning from Dubai) be-
longed to lineage B and was closely related to strains 
from Asia and Kenya. SARS-CoV-2 genomes identi-
fied from returning travelers from Dubai belonged 
to different lineages (UG002 and UG012 of lineage 
A, UG013 of lineage B, and UG014 of lineage B.1.1.1), 
suggesting these travelers contracted the virus from 
multiple sources despite sharing similar travel routes. 
In addition to air traffic, another means of SARS-
CoV-2 entry into Uganda is with drivers of cargo 
trucks entering the country through 4 main entry 
points from Kenya, Tanzania, and South Sudan (Fig-
ure 1). All 4 genomes from truck drivers from Kenya 
belonged to lineage B.1, whereas genomes from truck 
drivers from Tanzania belonged to lineage A and B.1 
(Table). The truck driver viral genomes did not clus-
ter closely with any current local Uganda genomes, 
suggesting that these truck drivers contracted the vi-
rus outside Uganda, although the sample size is too 
small for firm conclusions. Careful monitoring and 
additional sequence data from truck driver and com-
munity cases will enable an estimate of the amount of 
transmission that might occur between truck drivers 
and the general population of Uganda.
An indication of the current SARS-CoV-2 ge-
nomic sequence diversity (Appendix Figure 2) is 
the single nucleotide changes from the original Wu-
han-1 strain (GenBank accession no. NC_045512). 
The Uganda strains differ at 5–20 positions across the 
≈30 kb genome, including a small number of changes 
in the spike protein–coding region, which is a main 
target for vaccines. The spike protein showed 1 poly-
morphism with the lineage A viruses (including 4 
Uganda virus sequences), encoding D614, whereas all 
other clades encoded G614 in the spike protein.
Conclusions
We describe the initial SARS-CoV-2 genomes im-
ported into Uganda. We observed 6 lineages among 
20 genomes, which were imported through return-
ing air travelers and truck drivers entering Uganda. 
We shared all sequences with the public health com-
munity by depositing in the GISAID public data-
base (https://www.gisaid.org, accession nos. EPI_
ISL_451183–202) (8).
Since the governmental ban on international 
flights was implemented in the last week of March, 
no further imported COVID-19 cases from interna-
tional air travelers into Uganda have been reported, 
underscoring the effectiveness of these policy mea-
sures. However, the increasing detection of SARS-
CoV-2 in apparently healthy truck drivers is concern-
ing. The quantity of viral RNA levels in some truck 
driver samples is high (cycle threshold values 16–19), 
yet these persons were still capable of driving a truck, 
indicating mild symptoms. This combination of high 
viral levels and sufficient health to continue normal 
activities could lead to further spread of the virus 
within the community without effective quarantine 
measures. The current efforts to increase community 
testing and truck drivers contact tracing and quaran-
tine are essential to identify new cases and prevent 
further spread of the virus in Uganda.
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